Jane's Intelligence Review: "biofuels bring new global security risks"

It is interesting to see how some experts from a particular knowledge field - in this case strategic and geopolitical insight - make assessments about biofuels, a sector they are not particularly familiar with. This often leads to them either stating the obvious, painting an incomplete picture or making unsound analyses.

An excellent example comes from Jane's Intelligence Review, a publication on intelligence and defence. Everyone wants to have something to say about biofuels, so the defence and intel consulting business does so too. Independent analyst Anna Gilmour says "that while biofuels offer many advantages for producing countries, the potential long-term environmental degradation and increased competition for land and water resources means it cannot be viewed as a risk-free alternative to non-renewable fuels."

Of course, biofuels aren't risk-free, but the question is: what is the alternative? Why are biofuels produced in the first place? What if we don't produce them and just keep relying on oil? Will the risks be lower? Does continued oil dependency bring lower energy security risks? Are sky-high oil prices good for the economy and the poor? Obviously not. Biofuels are produced in order to mitigate the much bigger risks of increased oil prices, the potential socio-economic disasters brought by climate change and to reduce poverty and underdevelopment. But Gilmour does not make a comparative analysis, so her assessment of the risks of biofuels sadly remains rather marginal.

Earlier, a much more thorough assessment of the geopolitics and security risks of biofuels written by Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations) showed that - because they replace oil, which entails far more risks for conflict - biofuels substantially reduce geopolitical and strategic risks on virtually all parameters. Biofuels bring jobs to the rural masses, reduce migration pressures, bring income to the poor and increased food security, and they are produced in more than hundred countries that can all become traders, whereas oil is supplied by only a handful of (unstable) countries. (See: Future fuels and geopolitics: the role of biofuels - *.pdf).

Gilmour says greater use of land for biofuel production will inevitably mean a reduction in land for food crops at a time when the rising global population is putting increased demand on food and water supplies.

Note that this assessment is not based on a broad set of scenarios, some of which demonstrate that biofuels may bring new opportunities for high input agriculture to farmers who currently rely on extensive low input practises (such as slash-and-burn). Technically speaking, increased incomes from biofuels could eventually reduce the amount of land devoted to both food and fuel. Moreover, there is a vast expanse of land in the developing world, currently not under production, simply because it wasn't interesting to invest in it until now. Lack of investment, not lack of land is the problem.

Authoritative and scientific analyses, of which Gilmour apparently isn't aware, clearly demonstrate that without endangering food, fiber, fuel, forest, land and water resources for local people, the planet can support the production of 1500 Exajoules of internationally tradeable bioenergy and biofuels, by 2050. This is while taking into account rapidly growing populations. 1500EJ is roughly 3.5 times the total amount of energy currently consumed by the entire world (400EJ) from all sources (coal, oil, gas, nuclear):
energy :: sustainability :: fossil fuels :: oil :: climate change :: biomass :: bioenergy :: biofuels :: land :: poverty alleviation :: energy security ::

But governments definitely have to play a role in ensuring that infrastructures and policies make it possible to invest in this vast untapped land resource. Else, a rush on the most accessible land will occur.

Then, Gilmour makes a very strange point:

“While there is clearly a growing demand for the conversion to biofuel production it could also expose governments to rising social unrest, as food prices rise and poorer members of society reap few benefits from the new ‘wondercrop’. Apart from the social unrest and job losses, the expansion of this industry has the potential to increase internal conflict between governments and non-state armed groups in countries such as Colombia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines."

A questionable assessment, because the obvious contrary is more likely: due to their labor intensity, biofuels bring plenty of jobs, as Brazil has already demonstrated (6 million new jobs in the sector; Indonesia plans 2.5 million, Nigeria 3 million).

If Gilmour points to land-conflicts in certain countries, they are not the result of growing biofuel needs, they are the result of bad governance. In Indonesia, examples show that smallholders have sold their land to palm oil companies, to make a good profit with which they can now feed and educate their children for the first time. Alternatively, smallholders themselves make unprecedented profits on the biofuels boom.

Gilmour then takes a very local fait divers from Colombia, a narco-state under civil war, that has nothing to do with biofuels as such: "large tracts of supposedly unused land are actually used for illegal cultivation of coca plants, from which cocaine is extracted. With most of Colombia’s non-state armed groups heavily dependent on the lucrative cocaine trade, efforts to repurpose this land towards biofuel production would be strongly opposed on several fronts."

She continues:

"The Colombian government lacks the military strength to provide adequate protection to workers responsible for clearing coca and in convincing farmers to give up the lucrative coca crop. Also, the likely retaliation from insurgents will pose a long-term challenge to the development of Colombia’s biofuel industry", adds Gilmour.

Clearly, this is a highly localised problem that has nothing to do with biofuels as such. Not all countries in the South produce vast amounts of cocaine.


What we need is a much more robust analysis on the opportunity costs of biofuels. Why are biofuels produced? What if we don't produce them and just keep relying on oil? Will the risks be lower?

With high oil prices, prices for all productive sectors go up, from agriculture to industry and services, including basic food commodities; they jeopardize national governments' abilities to invest in social programmes and in poverty alleviation (already some developing countries spend twice the amount on oil, than on health).

Moreover, not using biofuels means greenhouse gas emissions keep rising much more quickly, with the potentially disastrous results we all know about: mass migration, drought, sea-level rise, conflict and war.

It is strange to see an independent analysis for such an authoritative publication making such a rather superficial analysis on one of the greatest transformations of our times.

But from what Gilmour writes, it is clear that some countries need strong policies and better governance, to ensure that paramilitary groups and gangs don't keep doing what they usually do: forcing people into labor or stealing their belongings (such as land). That should be so even without biofuels.

Also note: critics and cynical people would say that Jane's is in the business of creating risks. If there aren't such risks, they can always be imagined. If Jane's were to compare the risks of oil dependence with those of biofuels, it would however come to a more balanced view on energy risks.

References:
Jane's: Pursuit of biofuels bring new global security risks - July 16, 2007.

Clingendael International Energy Program, Lucia van Geuns: Future Fuels and Geopolitics: the Role of Biofuels [*.pdf] - December 9, 2007.